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The rise of international courts and other types of adjudicative bodies has been 
paralleled by the rise of interpretation and interpretation talk in international circles.1 
Some would say that that is only natural since that is what courts do, they interpret 
and apply the law and, therefore, the more cases there are the more interpretation 
there is. But interpretation also brings with itself a danger for what interpretation 
does is stoke the fear that judges will, rather than find out the meaning of the words 
and phrases used in treaties, manipulate the meaning of words in order to further 
their own personal ends. In order to ward off this possibility, the story goes, judges 
are required to follow a pre-set methodology or rules of interpretation that will 
“order and structure their reasoning process”2 and bind their discretion to the law 
properly enacted. Most agree that the core of these rules is set out in Articles 31-33 of 
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the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties3 although some propose additions to 
those rules (like rules on when and how to use dictionaries in searching for the 
“ordinary meaning” of a treaty)4 and that what currently is the main concern is their 
proper application since in certain instances “they are paid no more than lip service, 
even giving rise to the suspicion that some lawyers and judges perhaps lack 
familiarity with their actual content and manner of application”.5 In short what is 
currently the rage in international law scholarship is a methodology hope; hope that 
by having a methodology – a set of predefined rules that forestall the manipulation 
of interpretation of treaty texts – we will tie the judges’ hand to the meaning of the 
treaty.  
Of course, there is another side to this coin for what some argue is that 
interpretation of treaties has nothing to do with meaning and everything to do with 
refining and applying abstract moral principles dependent on the type of treaty in 
question.6 In this sense, meaning is something to be given to a treaty text depending 
on the abstract moral principle in question, and, therefore, what judges should do is 
reason and argue from the standpoint of abstract moral principles as understood in 
the context of the application of the treaty.  
What this paper will argue is that most authors have missed the point, at least 
the starting point, and very few7 have started with the question of what do we do 
when we do interpretation and what is, in fact, interpretation. It is my contention 
that by answering this question, what do we do when we do interpretation, will lead 
us to the conclusion that interpretation is not a methodology bound activity and that 
no methodology can follow from an account of interpretation. Furthermore, not only 
that a methodology cannot follow from our concept of interpretation, but that rules 
or methodologies of interpretation cannot fulfil the role that they have been assigned 
and in that sense are useless in providing us with the meaning of the text and as such 
constraining interpretation. However, I will argue that methodologies do constrain 
interpretation not in the way that they are designed but by their simple inclusion into 
                                                          
3
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 1155, P. 331. (1969) 
4
 Chang-Fa Lo, ‘Good Faith Use of Dictionary in the Search of Ordinary Meaning under the Wto Dispute 
Settlement Understanding’ (2010) 1 J Int Disp Settlement 431; Isabella Van Damme, ‘On 'Good Faith Use of 
Dictionary in the Search of Ordinary Meaning under the Wto Dispute Settlement Understanding'--a Reply to 
Professor Chang-Fa Lo’ (2011) 2 J Int Disp Settlement 231. 
5
 Gardiner RK, Treaty interpretation (Oxford University Press 2008) at 7. 
6
 Letsas G, ‘Strasbourg's Interpretive Ethic: Lessons for the International Lawyer’ (2010) 21 European Journal of 
International Law 509. 
7
 Letsas, ‘Strasbourg's Interpretive Ethic: Lessons for the International Lawyer’; Van Damme, Treaty 
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3 
the practice that we call law and, therefore, being no different than the other 
doctrines with which this practice is populated, like the Lotus principle, 
countermeasures, prohibition of aggression, self-defence and so on. They constrain 
interpretation by simply being legal doctrines that have to be invoked or dismissed 
in a judicial decision for the decision even to be seen as legal and judicial. I base my 
arguments on the insights of the so called original intuitionalists and philosophical 
pragmatists as applied to interpretation8 and see how they translate to international 
law.  
The argument in this paper is a straightforward one. It starts by giving an 
answer to the question of what do we do when we do interpretation. It outlines the 
main force of the argument – that if communication is to be possible then what a text 
means is what its author(s) intend it to mean, nothing more and certainly nothing 
less.9 The argument then continues by analysing the Report of the International Law 
Commission on the Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties10 and shows that the writers 
of the Report had the similar basic idea in mind (that it is the intentions of the parties 
that an interpreter is supposed to pay attention to and discover) and that the 
Commission in its report was more concerned with answering a different set of 
questions (what makes an authoritative interpretation, what makes up the best 
evidence of the parties’ intentions, what makes a “legally relevant interpretation”11) 
                                                          
8
 Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels, ‘Against Theory’ (1982) 8 Critical Inquiry 723; Steven Knapp and 
Walter Benn Michaels, ‘Against Theory 2: Hermeneutics and Deconstruction’ (1987) 14 Critical Inquiry 49; 
Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels, ‘Not a Matter of Interpretation ’ (2005) 42 San Diego L Rev 651; 
Walter Benn Michaels, ‘A Defense of Old Originalism ’ (2009) 31 Western New England Law Review 21; 
Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal 
Studies (Duke University Press 1989); Stanley Fish, ‘There Is No Textualist Position’ (2005) 42 San Diego L 
Rev 629; Stanley Fish, ‘Intention Is All There Is: A Critical Analysis of Aharon Barak's Purposive Interpretation 
in Law’ (2008) 29 Cardozo Law Review 1109; Larry Alexander and Salkrishna Prakash, ‘"Is That English 
You're Speaking?" Why Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility’ (2005) 41 San Diego L Rev 967; 
Stanley Fish, ‘Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in the Law and in Literary Criticism’ (1982) 9 Critical 
Inquiry 201; Stanley Fish, ‘Short People Got No Reason to Live: Reading Irony’ (1983) 112 Daedalus 175; 
Stanley Fish, ‘Wrong Again’ (1983) 62 Texas Law Reviw 229; Stanley Fish, ‘Fish V. Fiss’ (1984) 36 Stanford 
Law Review 1325; Stanley Fish, ‘Still Wrong after All These Years’ (1987) 6 Law and Philosophy 401; Stanley 
Fish, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech, and It's a Good Thing, Too (Oxford University Press 1994); 
Stanley Fish, The Trouble with Principle (Harvard University Press 1999) 
9
 Knapp and Michaels, ‘Against Theory’; Knapp and Michaels, ‘Against Theory 2: Hermeneutics and 
Deconstruction’; Knapp and Michaels, ‘Not a Matter of Interpretation ’; Michaels, ‘A Defense of Old 
Originalism ’; Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and 
Legal Studies; Fish, ‘There Is No Textualist Position’; Fish, ‘Intention Is All There Is: A Critical Analysis of 
Aharon Barak's Purposive Interpretation in Law’; Alexander and Prakash, ‘"Is That English You're Speaking?" 
Why Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility’ 
10
 International Law Commission, ‘Report of the of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its 
Eighteenth Session’ in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol II (1966) 
11
 Ibid at 220 para. 8. 
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than the question of what do we do when we do interpretation or what is 
interpretation. If that is so, then the Vienna Convention rules of interpretation (as 
well as the other rules that are left un-codified) turn out to be more useful as rules of 
writing texts and especially of rules of arguing for an authoritative (convincing) 
interpretation, rather than of rules on how to interpret a text. From thereon, I analyse 
some of the recent scholarly contributions to the interpretation debate and point out 
of the wrong headedness of thinking of judging as synonymous of interpretation– 
where the interpreter has a free choice between multiple meanings of a text – and still 
be able to call oneself an interpreter and how this misconception misdirects our 
inquiry of the constraint of judging in the direction of rules and methodologies of 
interpretation rather than the direction of legal conceptions, institutions and 
processes. 
Before I go into my argument I would like to make one caveat clear. My 
argument is not an indictment of the way that international tribunals and other 
quasi-adjudicatory bodies go about the everyday business of settling cases. It is not 
even intended to strike a note with practitioners of the judicial field for this paper is 
an academic exercise and it strives to explain and contextualize the practice of what 
most of international scholars call interpretation (which is something that I would 
not do) and emphasize that our current understanding in calling almost all outcomes 
of what international courts and quasi-judicial bodies do as interpretation, rather 
than judging (of which interpretation is just one part) has consequences in the very 
necessary inquiry of what constrains the normative power of courts and quasi-
judicial bodies in the international system.  
  
2. WHAT DO WE DO WHEN WE DO INTERPRETATION: THE SEARCH FOR INTENTION 
“‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, ‘it 
means just what I choose it to mean -- neither more nor less.’ 
‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so many 
different things.’ 
‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master – that's all.’”12 
 
                                                          
12
 Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There; Ilustrated by John Tenniel 
(Macmillan, St. Martin's Press 1972) at 130. 
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The discussion that Alice has with Humpty Dumpty is a great introduction 
into the topic that I wish to explore in this section, for a great many things hinge on 
the answer to the question “which is to be the master” of meaning. And in the 
discussion about interpretation and language most13 participants have chosen one of 
the following answers to the question: 
 
(1) A text, legal or otherwise, means what its author or authors intend. (2) 
The text itself, unless it is carelessly drafted, contains sufficient clues to its own 
meaning and should therefore be both the beginning and the end of inquiry 
(with legislative history and other "external" sources of information piecing out 
a middle if necessary). (3) The text means what those who ratify and/or 
interpret it take it to mean at the time of interpretation.14 
 
Needless to say, I am arguing for the first answer and believe that the other 
two answers are an impossibility; they are an impossibility because they forget what 
the purpose of language is. To understand interpretation is to understand that 
language is socially constructed and serves as a vehicle for communication. 
Language is a constructed code, a wide-spread code, a code known to a lot of 
individuals but a code nonetheless, one through which we try to establish 
communication and convey meaning. Notice that for communication to be possible 
the only one who can give a meaning to an utterance is its author; otherwise we 
would not be communicating but rather talking at each other. In that sense a text, an 
utterance, a speech act has “only one meaning, and […] whatever that meaning is, it 
never changes.”15 A speech act receives its meaning the moment it is produced and 
that meaning is the meaning its author gives it, in short, what its author intends it to 
mean.16 And this is the answer to Humpty Dumpty’s tease, “which is to be the 
master”, for if communication is to be possible at all, the master of the meaning of a 
speech act (a text, an utterance, a song) has to be its author and not its interpreter or 
an object that cannot even declare itself to be an object (a text) absent a purposeful 
                                                          
13
 Some have chosen all three see Fish, ‘Intention Is All There Is: A Critical Analysis of Aharon Barak's 
Purposive Interpretation in Law’ 
14
 Ibid at 1116. 
15
 Knapp and Michaels, ‘Against Theory 2: Hermeneutics and Deconstruction’ at 68. 
16
 Generally see Knapp and Michaels, ‘Against Theory’; Knapp and Michaels, ‘Against Theory 2: Hermeneutics 
and Deconstruction’ 
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creator.17 Where the problem of arises is not in the question of what an utterance 
means since it means whatever the author intended it to mean but whether and more 
specifically of how can we know the authors’ intentions (but for this a little bit later 
in the paper). 
And this is ultimately where the other two options fail for they presume that 
there is a difference between what an author means and what the text means.18 One 
set of answers is that a text means what the rules of language (semantic, syntax, 
grammar etc.) make it mean. Unfortunately, the rules of language produce multiple 
meanings for the same words, and there is nothing intrinsic in the words themselves, 
even when used in a sentence, that would give you a good enough clue as to what 
that word or sentence means. Therefore, text alone cannot determine a meaning, and 
an interpreter is forced to look to extrinsic evidence to settle the meaning of a text. 
And this is where the other set of answers come into play for they claim that 
because a text, even taken together with the rules of language, cannot point you to a 
meaning – they cannot provide you with a single meaning just a catalogue of 
possible meanings – it is the interpreter that ultimately gives the text (utterance, 
speech act) its meaning. But if this is the case, if the rules of language cannot give us 
a meaning and if, in the end, it is the interpreters that give a text its meaning then 
there is no reason to think that any interpretation is “right” or “wrong”19, there is no 
reason to argue with someone that she has got it wrong, no way to proceed in an 
argument about a texts’ (utterance, speech act), even a legal text’s, correct meaning 
for the meaning of the text will be whatever the interpreter decides it to mean. If the 
text (and the rules of language) is not the template against which we measure an 
interpretation (and if we discard the authors’ intention) then there is no way to argue 
that an interpretation is a right one or a wrong one (which we clearly do argue about), 
interpretation just is. And if the meaning of a text, utterance, speech act (conceptually) 
is always given by the interpreter, then there is no way to communicate, for we 
would not care what one says to us but what we (can) make of what one says to us 
and that would mean that we would be talking at each other and not conversing with 
each other. In this sense, language, utterances, words and their semantic meaning are 
                                                          
17
 Generally see Alexander and Prakash, ‘"Is That English You're Speaking?" Why Intention Free Interpretation 
Is an Impossibility’; Fish, ‘There Is No Textualist Position’; Fish, ‘Intention Is All There Is: A Critical Analysis 
of Aharon Barak's Purposive Interpretation in Law’; Knapp and Michaels, ‘Not a Matter of Interpretation ’; 
Michaels, ‘A Defense of Old Originalism ’ 
18
 Knapp and Michaels, ‘Against Theory’ at 723-724. 
19
 Ibid 
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nothing more than vehicles for the authors meaning and if we understand them as 
anything else – as objects that have their meaning or on which meaning can be thrust 
upon independent of an author and her message – then we are forgoing 
interpretation and doing something else. In the next four subsections I will give some 
examples of how these two approaches, the text (and rules of language) or the 
interpreter as the ones who give a text their meaning, fail.  
 
2.1. A Text Cannot Declare the Language it is Written in20 
 
Not long ago, a friend of mine (an English speaker) went to visit his friend in 
Bulgaria. In his first tour of the capital he noticed the following writing – 
PECTOPAH – on almost every establishment where you could sit down and order 
hot food and beverages. My friend asked his friend whether there was a monopoly in 
the restaurant business by this PECTOPAH company at which point his friend had a 
long laugh before telling him that the word PECTOPAH is the Bulgarian word for a 
restaurant. It is not hard to imagine how my friend could have gotten the meaning of 
the word PECTOPAH so wrong, for it is not unusual in Bulgaria (as in other 
countries) for businesses to have names spelled in more than one language or to have 
it spelled in a language that is not the language of the country. The confusion 
becomes obvious once one understands that in the Bulgarian alphabet the letter “R” 
is written “P”, the letter “S” is written “C” and the letter “N” is written “H”. There 
was nothing intrinsic in the text itself that could give a clue to my friend about the 
language it was written in and for all he knew there might well have been a company 
in the world that was named “Pectopah” that happened to establish a monopoly in 
the restaurant business in Bulgaria’s capital after the fall of communism, or that 
“Pectopah” was the name for a state run company that has continued its monopoly 
after communism. Notice that neither the text nor any rules of either language 
(English and Bulgarian) can settle the issue of in which language PECTOPAH is 
written in. Only by looking at extrinsic evidence (like the fact that my friend was in 
Bulgaria, and the fact that the sign was so ubiquitous in the capital) we can settle the 
issue of what PECTOPAH means. An even when we find out that in Bulgarian the 
                                                          
20
 The structure of this section mirrors the one given in section one of Alexander and Prakash, ‘"Is That English 
You're Speaking?" Why Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility’ 
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word restaurant is spelled PECTOPAH, we still cannot exclude the possibility that 
somebody in Bulgaria, for whatever motive (because she thinks she is being funny or 
sarcastic, or because she has a dislike of British tourists etc.) may have named his 
restaurant “PECTOPAH” using the Latin alphabet as the basis for the name. And the 
only way in which we would be able to discern her trick, her attempt at a joke, is by 
looking at her intentions, for absent an intention a word cannot have meaning, it 
would be a mere production of marks on a white surface, while with the presence of 
an intention those same marks acquire a meaning, a meaning that could be a more 
pedestrian one (type of business establishment) or a play of words, a joke, a pun, 
irony and so on and so on.21 And the only way to discover whether the writing on the 
wall is meant to convey a signal of a type of an establishment or an ironic name for a 
business is to look for evidence of the writer’s intentions for only that can give us the 
meaning of the word, for a meaning of a word is what its author intend it to have. 
Whether her attempt at a joke, a pun, irony would be understood by anybody is a 
different matter altogether, for failure to communicate is always a possibility, but 
failure to communicate does not equal a failure to mean, for we can give meaning to 
an utterance without it ever being understandable to anybody:  
 
In one sense the claim that intention cannot govern the scene of utterance 
seems to us correct. Even if, as we have argued, intention determines meaning, 
there can be no guarantee that the intended meaning will be understood. To say 
that the author cannot govern the scene of utterance is only to say that the 
author cannot enforce communication. A speaker or writer can always fail to 
communicate; misinterpretation is always possible.22 
 
Alexander and Prakash have similar examples in their paper on 
interpretation23 the typical one being the word canard. For instance, 
 
                                                          
21
 For the problems that arise out of trying to distinguish an utterance as ironic and its “normal” meaning see 
Knapp and Michaels, ‘Against Theory 2: Hermeneutics and Deconstruction’ at 54-55; Fish, ‘Short People Got 
No Reason to Live: Reading Irony’;  
22
 Knapp and Michaels, ‘Against Theory 2: Hermeneutics and Deconstruction’ at 61. 
23
 Alexander and Prakash, ‘"Is That English You're Speaking?" Why Intention Free Interpretation Is an 
Impossibility’ at 974-975 
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One cannot attribute meaning to marks on a page or to sounds without 
reference to an author, actual or idealized, who is intending to communicate a 
meaning through the marks or sounds. Consider the question of how to identify 
the relevant language of some communication. IF [intention free] textualists 
cannot explain how they identify the language of the text they wish to interpret. 
Apparently, they assume that identifying the relevant language is 
unproblematic. Seeing the word “canard,” an IF textualist who speaks English 
will assert that the word means “fib.” After all, that is the ordinary, public 
meaning that would come to mind for the well-informed, reasonable English 
speaker. But a French textualist will attribute a different meaning to the word. 
To the French IF textualist, “canard” clearly means “duck” because that is the 
ordinary, public meaning for the well-informed, reasonable French speaker. 
Which of these IF textualists is right? We believe that IF textualists cannot 
meaningfully answer this question.  
[…] Our claim is that we must posit the existence of some author if we are to 
attribute meaning to these statements. If we know the real author of “canard” 
generally speaks French, we most likely would conclude that “canard” in this 
context means “duck.” If the author usually speaks English, we most likely 
would conclude that it means “fib.” If we are unaware of (or indifferent to) the 
author's usual tongue (and likely intentions), we may imagine what we would 
have meant had we spoken the term, imagining ourselves as the authors.24 
 
Consequently, a text in and of itself cannot declare even in what language it is 
written in since one always has to postulate an author, a speaker of a specific 
language who has authored the text in order for one to see something as a text.  
 
2.2. Texts Cannot Declare That They Are Texts 
Without a reference to an author, real or imagined, one cannot attribute 
meaning to marks on a page, sounds on the radio, pixels on a computer monitor. To 
understand how difficult it is to imagine text without also having in mind an author, 
let us suppose that one morning a religious man comes knocking on the door of his 
                                                          
24
 Ibid 
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friend (who is an atheist) telling her that he has some wonderful news, he has 
discovered the face of Jesus in a piece of toast and that all arguments about the 
existence of God between them must now cease since the toast is God’s way of 
sending them a message that he/she exists. Setting aside matters of whether the 
atheist will see the piece of toast as a message or not, or whether she would be able to 
see the face of Jesus in the toast at all, the only way that the religious man in our 
example can see the face of Jesus in the toast and, moreover, can see it as a message, 
is to suppose that it was created by God (the Judeo-Christian deity), a purposeful 
being capable of having intentions and having meaning, and therefore, capable of 
communicating. Without having in mind something being created by a purposeful 
agent, an agent capable of having intentions, we cannot even see something as a text, 
an utterance, a speech act and cannot distinguish it from something that we write an 
a screen just to test whether we would like the font, or between words uttered and 
mere throat clearings.25 “Words alone, without an animating intention, do not have 
power, do not have semantic shape, and are not yet language.”26 
But this is exactly what defenders of the text and the rules of language as 
determinative of the texts’ meaning try to defend. “Men may intend what they will, 
but it is only the laws they enact which bind us”27 as it was so elegantly put by Justice 
Scalia. Another elegant example of this is given by Justice Scalia in his review28 of 
Seven Smith’s book Law’s Quandary29  
 
If the ringing of an alarm bell has been established, in a particular building, 
as the conventional signal that the building must be evacuated, it will convey 
that meaning even if it is activated by a monkey. And to a society in which the 
conventional means of communication is sixteenth-century English, The 
Merchant of Venice will be The Merchant of Venice even if it has been typed 
accidentally by a thousand monkeys randomly striking keys.30  
 
                                                          
25
 Fish, ‘There Is No Textualist Position’ at 632-633. 
26
 Ibid at 632. 
27
 Justice Scalia as quoted by Stanley Fish in Fish, ‘Intention Is All There Is: A Critical Analysis of Aharon 
Barak's Purposive Interpretation in Law’ 
28
 Antonin Scalia, ‘Law & Language (Review of Steven Smith's Law's Quandary)’ (2005) November 2005 First 
Things 
29
 Steven D. Smith, Law's Quandary (Harvard University Press 2004) 
30
 Scalia, ‘Law & Language (Review of Steven Smith's Law's Quandary)’ at 37.  
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To a subscriber of intention free interpretation this would be the ultimate 
argument, for to understand a meaning of a text, one should try to figure out the 
public meaning of the words (which we all know don’t we?) that are used, and if find 
out that the author meant something else than the standard public meaning then we 
should ignore that finding for what we text can mean is only what the rules of 
language allow it to mean.  
 However, there is a problem with this account of discovering meaning. First 
let me get back to Scalia’s alarm-bell-by-monkey example. The simple answer to this 
challenge is that “the bell would not convey a meaning if those who hear it know 
that a monkey has activated it, any more than it would convey a meaning if they 
know that it has been activated by a picture falling off a wall.”31 No intention behind 
the turning on of the alarm (since we do not consider monkeys to be intention 
wielding agents), no meaning to convey, it is simply mere noise, nothing to be 
“alarmed” about. However, if the people hearing the alarm bell know that that 
monkey that has pushed the button has also been trained to do so in the case of 
smoke then they would understand the meaning of the alarm bell as a signal to leave 
the building for this time they would not be understanding the public meaning of the 
noise produced by the alarm bell but the meaning given to the alarm by the 
monkey’s trainer for both the monkey and the alarm bell are the vehicles of the 
trainer’s intentions and her meaning (just like marks on a piece of paper) to alert 
people of the dangers of fire in the building. 32 No intention behind a mark, no 
meaning for that mark to convey even if that mark happens to look like the writing 
on a wall. Similarly with the Merchant of Venice written by a monkey or monkeys by 
striking keys blindly on a typewriter (given world enough and time a monkey on a 
typewriter could “write” the Merchant of Venice) for the text absent Shakespeare 
would not be recognizable as the Merchant of Venice for the Merchant of Venice is a 
play written by an intention wielding person. Without Shakespeare we would not 
have a Merchant of Venice but a text generated by monkeys at random that may and 
could mean anything. Absent Shakespeare there is no Merchant of Venice for 
without some presumed author (fate, destiny, God/s, Muses, spirits of the ancestors, 
nature) how do we start to unravel what the play means (or even if it is a play at all): 
                                                          
31
 Fish, ‘Intention Is All There Is: A Critical Analysis of Aharon Barak's Purposive Interpretation in Law’ 
32
 This example is taken from ibid at 1111 
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is it a political pamphlet of Elizabethan times, a social commentary, an anti-Semitic 
writing, an accident of nature never to be repeated?33 
 
2.3. Meaning Cannot Be Autonomous from Intent – One Must Always Identify an 
Author 
 
Let’s continue the story of the two friends and their dispute over the meaning 
of the mark on the toasted piece of bread. For the atheist the burned marks on the 
piece of toast may resemble a face but she is still not convinced that the burn marks 
are a picture of Jesus. During their discussion she learns that her friend has bought 
his new toaster from a novelty store which sells a limited edition of toasters. They 
then decide to go to the shop and ask the person that makes the toasters for some 
more information. He then tells them that yes the shape on the toast bread is a 
representation of Jesus, or the best representation that he could make it. He further 
explains that the toasters are meant to be sold as jokes – a proverbial whoopee 
cushion – that people can give to their friends. At this point both our friends agree 
that the shapes on the toasted bread is the face of Jesus but they also agree that the 
face is not there as a message that God exists, but as a message that mocks the 
faithful of a certain religion. The only reason why both our friends can acknowledge 
that the burned marks represent the face of Jesus is because they have found the 
intention behind the burned marks, the intention of the author of that message (the 
maker of the toaster) and his intention is to mock the sensitivities, the intelligence, of 
the faithful. Therefore, the burned piece of toast with the face of Jesus on it is a 
vehicle of the author’s (the toaster maker’s) intention to have fun (in a rather cruel 
way) on the expense of the faithful of a certain religion. 
However, let’s now suppose that the person who made the toast machine told 
our two friends that he did not intend to make a toaster that would burn faces of 
Jesus in the bread but that the novelty of the toaster was to be the LED flashing lights 
around the toaster that would signal that the bread is ready. This discovery would 
put our friends back at square one, since for the deeply religious person, the burn 
marks on the bread would be the face of Jesus (with God as the author), and for the 
atheist the burn marks would be just that burn marks, for even though they may 
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resemble the shape of a face (our brain can be funny like that)34, they certainly do not 
represent the face of Jesus and they are certainly not a message from God and the 
burn marks are the products of a freak accident or a strange alignment of the heating 
coils because for our atheist God does not exist; therefore, no purposeful author 
capable of having meaning, no message to communicate, no meaning, just oddly 
burned bread. Of course our atheist can say that the burn marks on the bread 
represent the picture of a man’s face, but she would not see the face as a message, as 
something that has and conveys meaning for no author capable of communicating a 
meaning is behind the burn marks. No author able to intend something, no author, 
no meaning, nothing that the toasted bread can “say” to her, it is simply something it 
resembles, an accident of nature.  
 
2.4. Texts Can Have “Deviant” Meanings Because Those Meanings Are Intended 
 
One of the problems that the proponents of the “text has its own meaning” 
stream of thought, is to explain how did all those different meanings in a dictionary 
come about. If the semantic meaning of words was a stable notion, if they had a core 
settled meaning then, surely, dictionaries, for example, would not have so many 
different entries under the same heading, nor would those same entries be pointing 
so far off topic of each other (what is the core here?). However, if one takes seriously 
the notion that language is a communal creation for the purposes of communication 
and if the meaning of speech acts is given by their authors, then language, and by 
extension dictionary meanings, would be the sum total of all speech acts. If words 
have the meaning that its authors give them (intend them to have as I and others 
claim) then all entries in the dictionary are an assemblage of the meanings that 
various authors have given different words over the years, ordered by the frequency 
of usage (the top entry being most frequently used and so on down the list to the 
least used meaning). 35  A dictionary is nothing more than a statistical record, a 
                                                          
34
 For an example of the brain tricking us to see something that is not there see 
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2011). 
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difficult one to compile for sure, but a statistical record nonetheless. New words get 
included and older ones get relegated to historical meanings all the time.36  
To have a clearer picture of how texts or words can have deviant meanings 
one only has to spend an hour with a group of teenagers to notice that certain words 
are used to assign meanings that might even be opposite from the normal, dictionary 
meanings, like the omnipresent “wicked” that now means “good,” great,” “terrific,” 
“cool”, so much so that Microsoft Word now gives me these options as synonyms of 
the word “wicked” and not antonyms and does not give me any of the meanings one 
can find in the Oxford English Dictionary37 for example (which maybe an indication 
of Microsoft’s marketing strategy of selling Microsoft Word to young people rather 
than the clergy). Moreover, to imagine a different situation is to imagine that words 
and language have an independent meaning other than the meaning that its authors 
give them; is to understand them as a source of meaning (independent of an author) 
rather than good evidence of what an author’s speech act means;38 it is to imagine 
that they have an existence and meaning prior to and outside of any communicative 
context; is to imagine that they are objects of Reality no different than the Sun or the 
Moon, object(s) for which we have found use for (like e.g. sharp stones for use of axe 
heads), but have not ourselves created.39 Unquestionably, words have been used with 
a specific meaning with enough of a frequency for us to have a good idea that when 
one says “wicked” one means evil. They have created reliance, the same way that a 
certain code has created a reliance among an intelligence community so that the 
communication between the members of that community (the CIA let’s say) will 
remain known only to the members of that community. For that is what language 
                                                          
36
 For instance the usage of a popular United States comedian of the word Thruthiness has been added to the 
New Oxford American English Dictionary with the rough meaning of “[t]ruth unburdened by facts” see Ben 
Zimmer, ‘Truthiness’ The New York Times Sunday Magazine (New York, October 13, 2010) at MM22 but also 
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37
 See the entry under “wicked” in the Angus Stevenson and Maurice Waite, Concise Oxford English Dictionary 
(12th ed. / edited by Angus Stevenson, Maurice Waite. edn, Oxford University Press 2011)  
38
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ultimately is, a code that is widely known and used as a vehicle for communication,40 
one we can opt in or out of using.41  
This is what ultimately leads us back to the Humpty Dumpty example, for 
Alice asks a very interesting question: “whether you can make words mean so many 
different things.”42 And the simple answers is yes, for Humpty Dumpty had the right 
question since the important question when it comes to understanding what do we 
do when we do interpretation is not whether words can be made to mean so many 
different things (they can), but what or who gets to shape the meaning of words 
(which is to be the master), and I hope by now the answer is clear, it is the author. 
Certainly, some would say, and author cannot just say anything, mumble a sound 
and still be taken as having a meaning, an author cannot just say “gobbledegook” 
and mean “would you be so kind as to pass me the salt please.” Can “gobbledegook” 
ever mean “would you be so kind as to pass me the salt please?” And the simple 
answer is yes, so long as that is what the author intended it to mean. The more 
relevant question here is not whether “gobbledegook” means “would you be so kind 
as to pass me the salt please” but whether we would be able to understand 
“gobbledegook” as to mean “would you be so kind as to pass me the salt please” for 
this is a separate question, for the first question is a conceptual one: what does an 
utterance (text, speech etc.) mean (it means what its author intends it to mean) and 
the second is an empirical one – whether we would be able to discover an author’s 
intention and therefore the utterance’s meaning 43  – and its answer depends on 
whether we have or do not have enough evidence of the authors’ intentions. The 
second question is an empirical one because of a simple fact, intentions are no more 
easily graspable, no more immediately identifiable then the text itself, for they too 
need to be interpreted, need to be searched for, and – when trying to convince others 
of one’s interpretation of a text – need to be argued for (or argued against). Intentions 
do not reveal themselves to us any more readily then the ordinary and plain meaning 
of a text. It is a question of whether the person uttering “gobbledegook” failed to 
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 Fish, ‘Intention Is All There Is: A Critical Analysis of Aharon Barak's Purposive Interpretation in Law’ at 
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communicate her intention and not whether she failed to mean for she meant exactly 
what she intended, nothing more and nothing less and she meant “would you be so 
kind as to pass me the salt please”. 
At last, what is the answer to the question what do we do when we do 
interpretation? And the short answer is we search for the authors’ intention, for what 
a speech act means is what its author intends it to mean. Unfortunately for law and 
lawyers, the consequences of this realization is that there are no consequences, at 
least no consequences to the way that one goes about interpreting, for it gives you 
the answer of the question what do you do when you interpret (search for intentions) 
and does not give you a way how to do it, how to find intentions, does not tell you 
what counts as evidence for intention, let alone what counts as good evidence for  
 
[i]t has no imperative; it doesn't go anywhere; it just specifies where you 
already are when you try to figure out where to go next. You already are 
operating within the assumption of something designed (intended), for if you 
were not – if you regarded what was before you as an object rather than as a 
message – there would be no reason to assign it a meaning, or (and this is the 
same thing) no reason to reject any meaning someone wanted to assign it. It 
would function as a Rorschach test.44 
 
3. THE EMPIRICAL QUANDARY  
 
The fear of a Rorschach test, when it comes to interpretation, is very real in the 
legal community. To understand the problems that lawyers face when trying to 
interpret a legal texts let me name some of the difficulties in figuring out what a legal 
text (statute, law, treaty) means (it means what its authors intend it to mean). When it 
comes to legal enactments several questions often arise: whose meaning (whose 
intentions) are the ones that should dominate: is it the intentions of the 
administrators that wrote the legislative text? Is it the intention of the ones who 
enacted the legal text or the ones who ratified it? What happens when the intentions 
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of the authors (it is normal in law for there to be more than one author) do not 
coincide, whose intention (and therefore whose meaning) is to prevail? 
And if the questions of whose intention are we to take seriously are not hard 
enough, we are still faced with the question of what counts as good evidence of 
intention. Is the published memoires of a diplomat who was present at the 
negotiations of a treaty good evidence of the parties’ intentions; is the travaux (and 
the statements of governments contained within it) good evidence of the parties’ 
intentions; and what about the statements of NGOs monitoring the negotiation and 
ratification process; the interpretative statements appended by various parties in the 
process of ratification; scholarly or newspaper articles contemporary to or pre/post-
dating the negotiations of the treaties; the text of the treaty itself, subsequent 
statements (practice) of the parties; statements of the international organization 
created by the treaty or entrusted by the treaty to perform a certain function etc., etc., 
etc.  
And this is where the concept of interpretation does not give any answers to 
these questions, for the answers to these and other similar questions is not an answer 
to the question what do we do when we do interpretation (we search for the 
intention of the parties) but an answer to the question what makes an authoritative 
interpretation - what makes an interpretation the right one – and this is an empirical 
question. It is an empirical question because it ultimately asks and answers the 
question: is this credible, believable, evidence of the intention of the parties and it is 
this question that the Vienna Convention and its Commentaries ultimately strive to 
answer by giving a single rule of interpretation through which one can assess what is 
an is not an authoritative interpretation. However, this choice of the drafters of the 
Vienna Convention does have consequences, not for the way we interpret (discover 
the meaning of a text) but for the acceptance of our interpretation for if the criteria 
for a “legally relevant interpretation”45 is the one set out in Articles 31-33 then an 
authoritative interpretation is the one that is argued through the lens of the VCLT 
rule of interpretation. 
 
3.1. The Commentaries to the Vienna Convention and Interpretation of Treaties  
                                                          
45
 International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries’ in Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, vol II (United Nations 1966) at 220 para. 8. 




The Commentaries to the VCLT are a useful starting point in contextualizing 
the proper role of the Article 31-33 VCLT rule for interpretation for they support both 
textualism – by giving primacy to the text of a treaty – and the notion of 
interpretation as a search for the intention of the parties. This apparent tension will 
be explained later in the paper but for now let’s start with the Commentaries’ choice 
to give primacy to the text. The Commentaries start their discussion on interpretation 
by categorizing the various basic approaches to interpretation (the text, the intentions 
of the parties and the object and purpose of a treaty),46 noting that “[t]he majority [of 
jurists] […] emphasizes the primacy of the text as the basis for interpretation of a 
treaty, while at the same time giving a certain place to extrinsic evidence of the 
intention of the parties and the objects and purposes of the treaty as a means of 
interpretation.” 47  Furthermore, in giving reasons why that specific rule of 
interpretation was chosen and not another (which eventually became article 31 of the 
VCLT) it said that “having regard to the divergent opinions concerning the methods 
of interpretation, it seemed desirable that the Commission should take a clear 
position in regard to the role of the text in treaty interpretation”48 and that “[…] the 
starting point of interpretation is the elucidation of the meaning of the text, not an 
investigation ab initio into the intentions of the parties.”49  
Nevertheless, one should not read into this as a full blown endorsement of the 
“textualist” methodology of interpretation, for the Commission was, on several 
occasions, clear that the endorsement of the text as the primary step in interpretation 
was only because of its belief that the text represents the best evidence of the 
intention of the parties. For instance, when starting to explain the rationale behind 
what is now the Article 31 rule, the Commission said that  
 
[it] is based on the view that the text must be presumed to be the authentic 
expression of the intentions of the parties; and that, in consequence, the starting 
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point of interpretation is the elucidation of the meaning of the text, not an 
investigation ab initio into the intentions of the parties. […].50 
 
Moreover, when discussing the previous use of maxims and principles of 
interpretation it stated that “[t]hey are, for the most part, principles of logic and good 
sense, valuable only as guides to assist in appreciating the meaning which the parties 
may have intended to attach to the expressions they employed in a document.”51  
However, and as I have pointed out earlier, adherence to strict textualism is 
not enough in itself, for a text on its own cannot resolve the issues of its meaning and 
therefore, extrinsic evidence for the text’s meaning must be sought – enter the other 
two principles endorsed by the Commission: “context, and object and purpose”, for it 
is, or so the Commission hoped, the combination all of the three principles (text, 
context and object and purpose) that would give the correct expression to the 
intentions of the parties. 
 
The Commission, by heading the article "General rule of interpretation" in 
the singular and by underlining the connexion between paragraphs 1 and 2 and 
again between paragraph 3 and the two previous paragraphs, intended to 
indicate that the application of the means of interpretation in the article would 
be a single combined operation. All the various elements, as they were present 
in any given case, would be thrown into the crucible, and their interaction 
would give the legally relevant interpretation.52 
 
Unfortunately, the Commission also decided to be very restrictive regarding 
its choice of context for if context is to provide evidence for the affixed meaning of a 
text (by providing evidence of the intention of the parties) then there is no reason to 
exclude any probative evidence of the parties’ intention regardless of the type of 
document in which it is found. However, for the Commission the only acceptable 
items of context are only those that “not only [were they] made in connexion with the 
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conclusion of the treaty but its relation to the treaty was accepted in the same manner 
by the other parties”,53 where the fact of the shared acceptance by the parties is far 
more relevant than the fact of the documents’ probative value. The balancing act that 
the Commission is trying to achieve is commendable, for ultimately what it is trying 
to achieve is the standardization of the sources of evidence of the parties’ intentions 
and thereby achieving a greater degree of predictability and certainty in outcomes 
rather than veracity to the parties intentions, and therefore to the respective treaty’s 
meaning. 54  It is sacrificing the meaning of the respective treaty or its specific 
provisions to a specific idea of the rule of law for which the typical argument would 
go something like this:  
 
the interpreter should seek out authorial intent, but in doing so should refuse 
to consider certain kinds of evidence thereof, even if reliable. For example, we 
might have reliable evidence that a law, which appears to be written in 
standard English and which can be given a sensible meaning therein, was 
actually written in nonstandard English, or Schmenglish. We could imagine an 
interpretive norm to the effect that lawmakers will be irrebuttably presumed to 
use standard English in writing laws. We might tell a rule of law story about the 
justification of such a norm, such as the need for the general public to know the 
laws, and so forth. And we might give a similar rationale for excluding even 
reliable legislative history – that is, that such history is not generally available, 
or that it can lead to nontransparent manipulations of the lawmaking process.55 
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 It seems that, from a contemporary perspective, the requirement of paying attention to context, or that context 
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(Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press 1997) at 38-40. However, the Commission here is not making an 
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legitimacy i.e. approved by the parties of the treaty. 
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And this is something that the Commission does; it presumes that the text is an 
authentic expression of the intentions of the parties and that the terms in it should be 
read as having their ordinary meaning. This ordinary meaning can then be tested 
against the background of a context which includes documents that are accepted 
(acceptable) by most if not all of the parties, and just in case the interpreter might 
have arrived at a meaning that does not do justice56 to the object and purpose of the 
treaty then that should be discarded in favour of one that does. In this sense, the 
Commission is trying to give at least three reference points with which the 
interpreter is supposed to check her interpretation: the ordinary meaning of the 
words, for which the word “ordinary” stands for those meanings used in the specific 
project that the treaty is suppose to further (if it is a trade law treaty then read the 
terms with the meanings that are usual in trade circumstances i.e. context) and that 
fits best with the goal that the parties wished to achieve with the treaty (object and 
purpose). One commentator on the general scheme of the ILC approach to 
interpretation wrote that  
 
The ILC adopted a combination of the literal and teleological approaches, 
viewing application of these as yielding up the intention. […] but the general 
significance of the approach is that by combining considerations of all relevant 
elements mandated by the Vienna rules, the resulting interpretation should 
achieve due respect for the intentions of the parties as recorded in the treaty text, 
taking account of the treaty’s object and purpose, but without making a wide-
ranging search for intentions from extraneous sources.57 
 
However, this position may have the consequences that if an interpreter 
follows these rules she may have to disregard the meaning that the parties originally 
affixed to the text for she might have to disregard some credible evidence of the 
parties’ intentions because it is not found in the Article 31-32 VCLT approved sources 
of evidence. Nevertheless, this may not be such a terrible outcome after all for if 
stability and predictability of outcomes rather than complete veracity to the meaning 
of a text is what you are after then the VCLT rule on interpretation might give you 
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just that. Having predictable standardized rules(s) and processes for giving a 
meaning to a text can accomplish this for “if our interpretive norms exclude certain 
kinds of evidence of lawmakers' intentions, the lawmakers will legislate in light of 
those norms, thereby narrowing the gap between the meaning they actually intend 
and the meaning that they will be deemed to have intended.”58 And this is partly 
what the Commission was expecting to happen since it says that “[i]n addition [,] the 
establishment of some measure of agreement in regard to the basic rules of 
interpretation is important not only for the application but also for the drafting of 
treaties.”59  
Notice, however, that once we move away from searching and arguing for the 
intentions of the parties we have moved away from interpreting, for if interpretation 
is the process by which we discover the meaning of a speech act assigned to it by the 
author, then the moment we move away from the authors intentions (and that is 
what the rule of interpretation in the VCLT ask as to do for it asks us to disregard 
credible evidence of authorial intention) we move away from interpretation. If we are 
not searching for authorial intention, or if we assign intention to someone or 
something other than the author (the ordinary man on the street, an idealized/perfect 
writer or reader,60 God or any other deity, spirit, muse etc., etc., etc.), we are no 
longer doing interpretation but writing/creating new texts and substituting them for 
the original authorial meaning. In that sense we have written the new meaning of the 
treaty even though we have used the same black marks on white paper as the 
previous author(s).61 
To better understand how it would be possible for the same marks on white 
paper (the “same” text62 as it were) to have different meanings over time and space 
let me give you an example of Vergil’s Fourth Eclogue and how it was read in the 
Middle Ages, since Christians in the Middle Ages read Virgil’s poems – and most 
other poems for that matter, even the ones written before the birth of Christ (like 
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Virgil’s poems) – as if they were Christian allegories.63 It might seem absurd or even 
abhorrent to us to force such an erroneous interpretation on someone’s poem but for 
one to understand how Vergil’s poems came to be read in this way one has to also 
understand that for Christians in the Middle Ages “God’s authorship of all human 
actions, physical and verbal”64 since time immemorial was a natural assumption of 
being; it was undisputed and it animated all interpretation. When all human art is 
the expression of God’s intentions working through the author it is not difficult to 
see how any piece of art (no matter how anachronistically and spatially divergent to 
the birth of Christianity) was seen as expressing an allegoric reading of Christian 
teachings and morals. Even more so, not only would such reading of Vergil’s poems 
be possible but would also be compelling and accepted for such a reading would 
stem from the very underlying assumptions of how the world works and how art 
was/is/will be produced. Christian reading of poems and art came with its own 
assumptions, with its own methodology if you will, and the end result maybe absurd 
from our standpoint but it was normal, natural, accepted even required in the 
Christian world of the Middle Ages.65 Even though we might think that this is an 
abhorrent case of wilfully misappropriating someone’s text for our purposes that 
would not be the case for though we now know that Vergil did not write Christian 
allegories, Middle Ages Christians did interpret Vergil’s poems; it is just that they 
started with assumptions of an author that we ourselves no longer share. Once those 
assumptions were changed and displaced with other assumptions about the world, 
about human beings as willing actors and about Vergil the author, the meaning of 
Vergil’s poems changed and we may have differing opinions of what the meaning of 
Vergil’s poems are, we are, nonetheless, sure that they are not Christian allegories. 
And this brings us back to the empirical quandary that we in the legal 
profession face and to an extent share with Middle Age Christians since for them the 
empirical quandary was no less challenging – they still had to interpret texts written 
by somebody else and usually written some time ago and they still had to find 
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evidence of that author’s intentions. Authorial intention was no less difficult or no 
less easy for that matter to discover centuries ago then it is now. For Middle Age 
Christians the underlying assumption was that God was the ultimate creator of all 
(past, present and future) art, and therefore, a poem or any other artistic expression 
was ultimately read as God’s expression and consequently in relation to Christianity 
and Christian doctrine.  
Contemporary international legal thought comes with its own assumptions 
about how to read a legal text and that is to assume (according to the ILC) that the 
text is the best evidence of the parties’ intentions. Therefore, when one reads the text 
of a treaty one is to presume that it is written “with the ordinary meaning […] [of] 
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its [the treaty’s] object and 
purpose.”66 And in the same way that the Middle Age Christian assumptions gave 
authority to the interpretation of Vergil’s poems (for they are argued within the 
assumptions and conceptions of evidence peculiar to the geography and period in 
question), the assumption that a treaty was written using the ordinary meaning of 
terms given their context also conveys authority to an interpretation for the “legally 
relevant”67 interpretation is the one that is produced and/or argued through the 
VCLT rule on interpretation. And if that interpretation forgoes the intention of the 
parties for the ordinary meaning of the terms then that is acceptable from the 
systematic perspective because a methodologically consistent interpretation brings 
about reliable, steady, predictable outcomes (or so the assumptions goes) and 
therefore the legally relevant ones.  
However, forgoing the parties’ intentions also means forgoing interpretation 
for in this case the interpreter is giving up discovering the meaning that the author(s) 
affixed to that text and is substituting the authors’ meaning with a meaning 
produced in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the words taken in their 
context (understood narrowly and impoverished with strict limitations) and in light 
of the convention’s object and purpose. In this case any overlap between the legally 
relevant interpretation and the original authorial meaning is left to chance for it will 
depend on the frequency of the parties’ intentions to use words in their ordinary 
meaning (ordinary for who?) for if they did not do so and if the interpreter 
knowingly disregards this knowledge because it is not found in the VCLT approved 
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 Article 31(a) of the , Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 1155, P. 
331.  
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 Commission, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries’ at 220, para. 8. 
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sources of information then the interpreter no longer deservers that name for she will 
no longer be interpreting but writing a treaty. Nevertheless an “interpretation” (not 
always deserving that word for it may or may not coincide with the meaning of a text 
given by its authors) that is produced in this way has legitimacy for it is produced (or 
argued for) under rules and processes and assumptions that are themselves (at this 
time) legitimate.  
 
4. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INTERPRETATION AND JUDGING  
 
Perhaps the best way to explain the difference between interpretation and 
judging would be to reiterate that arguing for the understanding that what a text 
means is what the author intends it to mean is not the same thing as arguing for what 
is today known as the intentionlist methodology of interpretation68 for the argument 
that a text means what its author intends it to mean is not an argument for a 
methodology but a direction of inquiry, an inquiry that has to be conducted if one is 
to discover the meaning of a text. To explain the difference, I will modify another 
example used by Alexander and Prakash.69 Let us suppose that my grandmother 
wants to come for a visit and she tells me over the phone that she would like me to 
move the “autobahn” next to the sofa. Now the ordinary and public meaning of the 
word autobahn is a German type of a highway and that if I believed that this is what 
my grandmother meant when she told me to move the autobahn next to the sofa then 
I would have to conclude that my grandmother has lost her wits and that it might be 
time for her to move in with my parents and be taken care of (in a non-mafia type 
way), or that she was still lucid but in great disillusion about my financial means and 
organizational skills. However, I know my grandmother better, and because I know 
that she has not lost her wits and that because her native language is not English (or 
German) and she makes frequent mistakes and because she likes to rest her legs 
when watching the television, I therefore know that when she said autobahn she 
meant ottoman. Assessing all of the evidence before me about my grandmother’s 
likely intentions when she uttered the word autobahn I know that she meant 
                                                          
68
 Some explanation of what intentionalism is as well as an argument for a version of intentionalist methodology 
of interpretation see Letsas, ‘Strasbourg's Interpretive Ethic: Lessons for the International Lawyer’ at 511-514. 
69
 Generally see Alexander and Prakash, ‘"Is That English You're Speaking?" Why Intention Free Interpretation 
Is an Impossibility’ at 978 and 994-995.  
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ottoman when she said autobahn, and this is the end of my interpretative task. 
Unfortunately, the ottoman is broken and it cannot be of any use to her in propping 
up her legs. Would I, therefore, still be doing interpretation if I were to substitute this 
(now correct) meaning – bring the ottoman in the living room – with the meaning – 
go and buy an ottoman – and would I still be doing interpretation if I were to 
understand the meaning of the sentence “bring the autobahn in the living room” as 
“go and buy an ottoman”? Clearly not, for what my grandmother intended to tell me 
was to bring the ottoman in the living room and not go out and buy one. It might not 
satisfy her goals of having somewhere to rest her feet, but that does not mean that 
she meant something else when she told me to “bring the autobahn in the living 
room.” It is a completely different question of whether I would be justified to go and 
buy an ottoman for her visit, for that question is a question of exercising proper 
prudence in executing the requests (commands) of somebody else (e.g. the 
legislature), if I were a judge and my grandmother the legislator it would be the 
question of what is to be the proper function of courts and what are they supposed 
and allowed to do, but it is not a question of interpretation for interpretation stops 
once we (believe we) have discovered the meaning (by finding the authors’ intention) 
of an utterance.  
This example should make it clear that an interpretation of a text has done its 
interpretative work once we have a good idea of the intentions (and therefore the 
meaning) of the author(s) and what we do next once we have arrived at that 
interpretation is something completely different from interpretation, for the process 
of interpretation does not tell you what to do after you have completed the task of 
interpretation since new questions may arise (and different answers will be given 
then the one given to the question what do we do when we do interpretation) with 
the situation of what do we do when we do not like the meaning so discovered, or 
when we come to the conclusion that (as it may happen in international law) each 
party has meant something different when signing the text of the treaty then the 
other parties? What happens if the meaning of a legal text does not coincide with our 
(society’s) conception of justice? What happens if the intention of the parties do to 
laps of time or secrecy has been lost and no credible evidence exists for their 
intention? What is a judge to do if she is asked to apply a law that requires the death 
penalty for homosexuals? Would she still be interpreting if she were to “interpret” 
the text of the law not to require the death penalty understood as ending a person’s 
life but as ending a person’s romantic life (i.e. requiring social death) by requiring 
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that person not to engage any longer in homosexual sex? I think not, for what she 
would be doing is supplanting the meaning that the legislator gave to the law with 
the meaning that she gave to the law. She would be re-writing the text of the law 
rather than interpreting it, and if this re-writing was accepted by other judges and 
the community at large and becomes used in later cases as the law’s meaning then 
she has thus become the author of the now new law and the author of the law is no 
longer the original legislator (parliament).70 This may or may not be a legitimate 
outcome, depending on one’s point of view regarding the proper role of courts – for 
this is a question of the proper role of courts – but this outcome is not an 
interpretative one, but it is a legal one.71 
These are questions that the concept of interpretation cannot, and does not 
answer for the answer to these questions are found in concepts other than the 
concept of interpretation; concepts that have more to do with our basic 
understanding, assumptions and values of the legal and political system in question 
of which some rules of interpretation (not really interpretation at this point but rules 
of judging) might form a part of. For example, let’s take the rules found in Article 
33(4) of the VCLT since this provision answers the question what to do when the 
same provision in a treaty can be understood to have different meanings in different 
languages that not only evoke different meanings but different legal concepts. For 
instance, let us presume that the doctrines of murder in the US and France are 
different and that when these states decided to sign a treaty on extradition in two 
authentic languages each meant that the word murder (in French it would be 
assassiner) meant what it means in their national jurisdictions. A judge faced with 
the task of judging a case arising under this extradition treaty would have a hard 
choice ahead of her once she came to the conclusion that the parties had intended 
(when they used the respective words murder and assassiner) different legal 
concepts, but her choices would not be interpretative ones for her interpretative task 
has been completed once she has understood the provision in the treaty according to 
the intention of the parties (she has found the meaning) and, therefore, no more 
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interpretation is necessary for the French speaking party meant the French doctrine 
of assassiner when it signed the treaty and the English speaking party meant the US 
doctrine of murder even though they signed the same treaty authenticated in two 
different languages. However, this does not end the adjudicative task of our judge 
for she still has to come to a decision regarding the case and she has several options 
ahead of her like pronouncing that there was no agreement between the parties in 
this instance and that the case should be dismissed, or that because of the principle of 
double criminality the extradition should not move forward because what is murder 
in the US is not murder in France, or to follow the rule under Article 33(4) and 
assume that “in law there is only one treaty—one set of terms accepted by the parties 
and one common intention with respect to those terms—even when [the] two 
authentic texts appear to diverge”72 and that, therefore, what she should do is adopt 
the meaning that “best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose 
of the treaty”73 and, consequently, chose one meaning over another.  
Note, however, that none of the options available to her are interpretative ones; 
they are rather legal options for the question of the meaning of the treaty provision 
(and now we know that that there are two treaty provisions because the intention of 
the parties diverge) has already been answered – for the US it means murder and the 
doctrine that it invokes and for France it means assassiner and the doctrine that it 
invokes – and no amount of further interpretation will change the fact that the two 
parties had different intentions and therefore two different meanings. The answer 
might be that the French meaning of assassiner fits better in the object and the 
purpose of the treaty and, therefore, that it should be the one governing the case but 
it is not the answer to the question what does the treaty provision mean, but it is the 
best option in this particular instance. And if our judge is successful in her 
argumentation that it is the French doctrine that should prevail and other courts or 
the parties themselves accept her argumentation and adjudicate in similar cases 
similarly then our judge would have successfully re-written the treaty provision (or 
created one since if there was no original agreement there was no treaty provision) 
and not interpreted it. 
Nevertheless, some might argue that there is a difference between 
interpretation in international law or law in general and interpretation that happens 
in other disciplines or practices and everyday life. They would argue that in law 
                                                          
72
 Commission, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries’ at 225 para. 6. 
73
 , Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 1155, P. 331. 
MultiRights Research Paper 
 
29 
different techniques and methodologies of interpretation have emerged and that the 
word interpretation is now more synonymous with judging since whatever outcome 
results from a judicial decision found in a judgment it will be called an interpretative 
one regardless of what interpretation means in other disciplines and that, therefore, 
insights from other disciplines are of no relevance and cannot shed any useful light 
on the interpretative/adjudicative (at this point insert word as appropriate) process. 
And certainly one can find support for this argument in recent writings about 
interpretation in international law.  
For instance, let’s start with the concept of restrictive interpretation. As has 
recently been noted by Luigi Crema74 the concept of restrictive interpretation has 
gone through several shifts in its meaning and use over the centuries depending 
mostly on the underlying values that underpinned international law at the time.75 
Always couched in abstract, neutral terms “odious clauses are to be interpreted 
restrictively” its use changed over time depending on the value that underpinned the 
term odious. Vattel, for instance, included a list of examples and values that should 
give guidance to interpreters of when to interpret clauses restrictively and when 
expansively, 76  which included among others the common advantage, useful for 
human society, whatever contains a penalty, “whatever tends to change the present 
state of things” for example.77 As international society changed together with its 
underlying values, the direction towards which restrictive interpretation tilted also 
changed and in the 19th and early 20th Century restrictive interpretation meant 
interpreting in favour of state sovereignty.78 The second half of the 20th and the 
beginning of the 21st Century has seen another shift of values and the canon of 
restrictive interpretation as understood in the previous two centuries is disappearing 
and new directions of restriction are emerging. 79  Crema concludes that 
“interpretation is not a disinterested application of rules”80 but “value-oriented”81 a 
fact which has been “explicitly admitted” 82  in the past and that despite its 
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contemporary cloaking with “value-neutral statements”83 and “rhetorical use of the 
Latin maxims”84 it still remains to be so. Furthermore,  
 
A firmly value-oriented interpretation can be accepted, tolerated, and 
justified in specifically defined phases in order to aid a new political consensus 
which encompasses a broader conception of human society, against an old 
status quo which failed to consider an important part of it.85 
 
Very well put. However, one does have to notice a couple of things about 
what is understood under interpretation (albeit a restrictive one) for Crema, for he 
says that “‘[r]estrictive interpretation’ is the interpretative choice which restricts the 
meaning of a text. In an original sense, it is restrictive in favour of the real intentions 
of the parties, as opposed to what is expressed in a text.”86 Clearly, for Crema, the 
text has meaning independent of what the parties intended and, as he understands 
the operation of this maxim, it is this meaning that has to be restricted in favour of 
upholding a certain value like fidelity to the parties’ intentions or to the interests of 
preserving sovereignty or to the interests of the international community and so on.  
But that is partly the problem for he steps into the now all too familiar trap of 
thinking that a text’s meaning and the author’s meaning are something separate and 
that it is the interpreter who ultimately decides between them as well as between 
other meanings for he sees the original use of the maxim as an attempt to constrain 
an interpretation. Crema’s paper is a descriptive one, and it describes what he sees to 
be the process of interpretation which presupposes a free, unconstrained interpreter 
that can make anything out of a text (restrictive interpretation is ultimately a 
conscious “interpretative choice” not only between a text’s meaning and an authorial 
meaning but between different values as well) and therefore this interpreter needs to 
be constrained by tying her to specific values, originally to the meaning that the 
parties gave the treaty which later shifted to the list of values given by Vattel, which 
later shifted to the value of pro-sovereignty that is in flux today with a shift to values 
of pro-individuals and/or pro-international-society etc. And that is the problem of 








 Ibid at 682-683. 
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the concept of restrictive interpretation as described by Crema for it is interpretation 
left behind since it leaves any meaning (authors’ or text’s) side-lined since if 
interpretation is about finding a meaning (authors’, text’s, painting’s) then restrictive 
interpretation is meaning (author’s, text’s) scaled back, a round peg squared so as to 
fit a specific and historically contingent value system. It is creating and assigning 
(giving) meaning rather than discovering. A more correct approach would be to say 
that judging “is not a disinterested application of rules” 87  and that it is “value 
oriented”88 and that this process has been cloaked in “value-neutral statements”89 and 
“rhetorical use of Latin maxims” 90  since what is actually going on is not 
interpretation but judging, of which interpretation is just one part/step. 
Letsas has a similar position regarding interpretation of treaties and for him 
the object and purpose of the treaty is what gives us the guide as to what method of 
interpretation to adopt in the first place,91 for as he puts it “how else could they 
[treaties] be interpreted” other than looking at the object and the purpose of a 
treaty.92 The concept is simple, any statement of fact about what a treaty means is 
contingent on a value statement on why that statement of fact is relevant to the 
interpretation process if we are to avoid infinite regression.93 When it comes to treaty 
interpretation, that value statement is the “moral duty to respect and help states pursue 
their joint projects, other things being equal (e.g. assuming the projects are unethical, 
etc.) (emphasis in the original).”94 Consequently, the process of interpretation is a 
thoroughly evaluative process, where the meaning of the treaty is given by 
evaluating the different normative pursuits and deciding on the different weight that 
is to be given to each of them.95 Treaty interpretation is an evaluative not an empirical 
exercise. Furthermore: 
 
[F]or each treaty, the appropriateness of any interpretive technique depends 
ultimately on what project, as constrained by values of international law, states 
are taken to have agreed to pursue. There are no general methods of treaty 
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interpretation, if by ‘methods’ we mean some set of fixed rules which takes the 
relevance of certain facts (e.g. preamble, state intentions, practices, etc.) as 
given.96 
 
 Moreover,  
 
My [Letsas’] main thesis is that treaty interpretation is fundamentally neither 
about the meaning of words nor about the intentions of states parties. It is an 
inherently evaluative exercise in seeking to determine how fact-independent 
moral values normatively constrain the pursuit of states’ joint projects. The 
weight an interpreter should place on states parties’ intentions and on the text 
of a treaty depends on the moral character of the project which states seek to 
pursue. Different kinds of projects will call for different kinds of methods of 
interpretation. To interpret a treaty is ultimately to interpret a moral value. (footnote 
omitted)97 
   
Where Crema starts with a conception of meaning(s) and a free interpreter but 
ends up with meaning left behind for (or at least squared up to) a certain value, 
Letsas does not even start from a concept of meaning for meaning has no role to play, 
and it has no role to play since courts are there to help states fulfil the projects they 
seek to pursue “because [of their] […] moral duty to respect and help states pursue their 
joint projects, other things being equal.”98 Most of the time this would mean sticking 
to the agreements that the parties reached (sticking to their “original” meaning as it 
were) but not always and especially not in the case of human rights treaties for in the 
case of human rights treaties the “abstract intentions” of the parties was to protect 
human rights in their morally abstract way for “[t]he truth of these general moral 
propositions does not depend on institutional recognition or communal 
acceptance”99 and therefore, the moral meaning of these rights in their abstract is far 
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more important than the very specific intentions that govern the meaning of the text 
of the treaty. Ultimately  
 
If the purpose of international human rights law is to make states 
accountable for violation of some fundamental moral rights which individuals 
have against their government, then the purpose of human rights courts is to 
develop, through interpretation, a moral conception of what these fundamental 
rights are. It is to discover, over time and through persuasive moral argument, 
the moral truth about these fundamental rights. In order to fulfil this purpose, 
neither empirical inquiries into the consensus between states parties nor 
dictionary definitions are required.100 
 
Letsas’ account maybe an account of something, it certainly maybe be an account of 
how the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) adjudicates (comes to and 
justifies its decisions) but it is not an account of interpretation, it is not an answer to 
the question what do we do when we do interpretation. It is an account of judging, 
one that starts from the ECtHR and abstracts away to explain judging in other 
branches of international law. Furthermore, it is a justification for what is known as 
the “evolutive interpretation” or interpretation of a text as a “living instrument” used 
in many human rights courts, an “interpretation” that presupposes that there is a 
meaning of a legal text that is given by its authors and an interpreter is supposed to 
go beyond it, and this beyond, in Letsas’ case, is towards a specific direction based on 
abstract moral values. 
However, “evolutive interpretation” may be what courts actually do when 
they settle cases but it is not interpretation for it is no different from “restrictive 
interpretation” because the way restrictive interpretation works is that it restricts a 
meaning of an “odious” clause for the benefit of a certain value, while an “evolutive 
interpretation” “extends”, goes beyond, the meaning of a text again in favour of 
certain (in this case, abstract) moral values. It is a step one does after one has finished 
interpreting, has found what the meaning of the treaty provision is and finds it 
lacking, and it is a step that gives meaning to the text of the convention thus at the 
same time re-writing it to fit the content of a perceived abstract moral value. It may 
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be a good account of what courts, especially what human rights and international 
criminal courts do when they decide cases101 but it is not an account of interpretation, 
it is an account of judging. If it were an account of interpretation then we would have 
to assume (if we ascribe to this account) that this process is the same one that states 
go through when they themselves interpret treaties - giving the meaning of a treaty 
provision that best fits their (abstract) moral values – which one has to admit is a 
recipe for disaster for it presupposes that, regardless of what the parties agreed, each 
one of them will give the meaning to a treaty provision that best suits them or their 
understanding of the international system’s moral values and not the meaning to 
which the parties agreed. The question that begs to be asked is why even conclude 
treaties at all if every party will later “interpret” treaty provisions not according to 
the meaning that the authors gave it, but according to its own view of abstract moral 
values currently in place in the international system, or its view of the abstract moral 
values of the authors of the treaty. Clearly, this is not a coherent concept, at least not 
a coherent concept of interpretation but an account of and an instruction to judging. 
But there are other accounts of what interpretation or rather what 
interpretative methodologies are, and we can find this in the writings of Grover102 on 
the way that the international criminal tribunals have used interpretative 
methodologies. Where Letsas starts with a presupposition about what is 
interpretation, i.e. the evaluation of the compliance of the parties’ agreement with 
abstract moral values (especially in human rights interpretation), Grover does not 
start from answering the question what is interpretation or what do we do when we 
do interpretation rather her aim is to establish a methodology of interpretation (not 
unlike the one set out in Article 31-33 of the VCLT) for international criminal law.103 
She understands a method of interpretation to “mean a systemic general approach to 
reasoning through the resolution of interpretative issues.”104 Furthermore  
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A fully developed method has three tiers. It offers its user, in this case judges 
and lawyers in the field of international criminal law, the following levels of 
assistance: (1) a primary interpretative principle to guide their reasoning 
process when confronted with interpretative issues; (2) arguments or reasons 
which support this interpretative principle; and (3) a catalogue of materials of 
aims which must, may and, if applicable, may not be taken into account in 
support of those arguments.105 
 
Grover does not define what these guiding principles are, but from the 
following paragraphs it becomes clear that, for her, principles of interpretation are 
the different approaches that courts have taken in the course of their adjudicative 
processes. For instance, she lists the “following principles of interpretation: literal, 
logical, purposive, effective, drafter’s intent, and progressive”106 all of which have 
been used by the ICTY or ICTR at one point or another. The problem as she sees it is 
that these guiding principles “have [not] been authoritatively defined, and so their 
meanings vary through the jurisprudence [of the ad hoc tribunals] and sometimes 
overlap.” 107  And as she rightly observes “arguments supporting interpretative 
principles are not clearly connected to the interpretative principle to which they 
adhere” 108  all the more confusing the interpretative process and mixing up the 
guiding principles of interpretation and the justifications for their use in a specific 
case and context.109 Coupled with the terse nature of the ICTY and ICTR statutes it is 
not surprising that the “jurisprudence of the ICTY and the ICTR [has] not yielded a 
prevailing hermeneutic for international criminal law.”110 Hence Grover’s search for a 
method, and not just any kind of method, but a neutral one, one that can stay away 
from any substantive point of view or value and be able to achieve the procedural 
justice ideal toward which international criminal law strives with the creation of the 
International Criminal Court. 111  It is clear that in Grover’s view, a proper 
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 “For example, judges have used the principle of literal interpretation to endorse arguments favoring both strict 
and broad interpretations of impugned words. On other occasions, bald statements about the prudence of 
adopting a broad interpretation of a phrase, for example, are not buttressed by an explanation about how this 
argument achieves the greatest faithfulness to a particular interpretative principle (e.g., progressive 




 See the discussion under the heading titled “Normative Dilemma” ibid at 550- 
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methodology, a neutral methodology, will cure the deficiencies of the substantive 
justice approach of the ad hoc criminal tribunals – the bedrock of contemporary 
international criminal justice – and will allow the ICC to deal with the challenges of 
arbitrariness and victors’ justice hurled at the ad hocs.  
Unfortunately, Grover herself points out the difficulties of this search for a 
methodology in her section titled “normative dilemma”.112 She does a marvellous job 
of explaining and contextualizing the normative births of international criminal law – 
the tri-lateral influences of human rights, humanitarian and domestic criminal law – 
as well as the debates of substantive justice versus strict legality, but it seems that she 
has missed the insights of her own analysis. For instance, she points out the (in 
concept) different objects and purposes that international human rights and criminal 
justice favour by saying that “while the object and purpose of criminal justice favours 
the strict construction of statutes, the object and purpose of international human 
rights instruments is invoked to justify generally broad interpretations of crimes to 
ensure that ‘harms are recognized and remedied, and that, over time, there is 
progressively greater realization of respect for human dignity and freedom’,” 113 
while in the next sentence pointing out that the conflicting nature is not so conflicting 
at least in the case where the rights of the accused are also human rights.114 A similar 
back and forth is presented in the broader or narrower protection of individuals in 
human rights or humanitarian law while at the same time acknowledging that 
“international human rights has had a ‘humanizing effect’ on international 
humanitarian law” and that “many international crimes initially ‘emerged directly 
from’ international humanitarian law or were at least characterized as such.”115 But 
nevertheless the bond between international criminal law and international human 
rights law is strengthening. The apparent tension is not so apparent it seems.  
A similar back and forth repeats itself when it comes to the discussion of 
substantive justice and strict legality (or procedural justice). It first starts with 
describing the (apparent) tension between the two concepts – namely that the 
substantive justice concept requires that wrongs should be punished regardless of 
whether those wrongs were laid down in the law or not at the time of the 
commission and that the strict legality concept “purports to punish an individual 
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only for acts which were criminal when performed so as to protect individuals 
against the harsh and arbitrary exercise of state power”116 – and then goes on to 
relieve that tension by saying that  
 
“[w]hile most criminal law jurisdictions have adopted a doctrine of strict 
legality in theory, and invoke it to justify the principle of legality, 
considerations of substantive justice have, in practice, qualified the principle’s 
application in absolute terms ... [and] that, like domestic criminal law 
jurisdictions international criminal law cannot adhere to strict legality doctrine 
absolutely.”117 
 
Consequently, “the legality principle applied at the international level may therefore 
be ‘subject to a number of significant qualifications.’”118 This, and other instances 
throughout her paper (the difficulties with treaties over time and their relationship to 
customary law, the necessity for “catch-all” phrases) show the difficulties of 
searching for a method, at least of the kind that Grover aspires, which is a neutral 
one, one that mediates between but is not beholden to any of the normative 
directions that inform international criminal law.  
Unfortunately for Grover, such a method cannot exist since a place that is not 
informed by any particular context, or any particular point of view cannot exist for 
we are always and already situated in a context and a point of view119 and there is no 
neutral perspective from where to construct such a method. Certainly a method is 
possible, one that is full of abstract principles, like the strict legality principle (which 
among other things requires that judges not make or update the law) but as Grover 
has wonderfully shown in her paper they simply are of no help when it comes to 
guiding the practice of judging as well as the empirical task of interpretation and that 
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in practice what we have in terms of methods are rules of thumbs,120 rules that are 
very much connected to the specific contextual situations in which judges engaged, 
not unlike the ones described by Grover herself in her excellent account of how 
judges have, dependent on the circumstances at hand, used and shaped 
methodology (wholly in its now week form) by practice over time. Nothing in her 
paper offers a glimpse of what this neutral methodology might look like. What it 
does offer is plenty of arguments of why judges should not strive for developing a 
kind of methodology that Grover sets out to create, for she herself has given many 
rules of thumb suggestion to judges, like if customary law is more progressive than 
the substantive crimes of the statute then judges should be informed in their 
decisions by it; or if customary human rights norms offer a better protection of the 
defendant’s procedural rights then judges should take them into account and decide 
accordingly, or when the Rome Statute crimes conflict with human rights like the 
example of hate crimes and incitement to genocide – for which she offers six 
arguments why Article 21(3) would best be served to be read one way instead of 
another (in which the intent of the parties is only one, albeit the first, argument)121 but 
not one of those suggestions are neutral in the sense uninformed by the normative 
strains to which international criminal law is beholden to. A methodology could 
never give Grover what she wants – a neutral set of hard rules that if applied would 
lead to a neutral interpretative solution – for as she demonstrates herself the rules 
would either be in favour of the accused, or in favour of the victims and harms that 
need to be remedied, be informed by humanitarian concerns or concerns for legality 
and procedural justice, for the term best can only be seen as best if viewed from a 
certain point of view, one that is historically and socially contingent, one in which we 
are always and already in and therefore in no need to define it,122 but to argue for it 
or against it not from a neutral position but from the partisan and contingent 
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position we are always in,123 as Grover herself is masterfully doing in her paper. The 
ILC clearly pointed out in their Commentaries the contingency and contextuality of 
interpretative principles and maxims by saying  
 
Thus, it would be possible to find sufficient evidence of recourse to principles 
and maxims in international practice to justify their inclusion in a codification 
of the law of treaties, if the question were simply one of their relevance on the 
international plane. But the question raised by jurists is rather as to the non-
obligatory character of many of these principles and maxims. They are, for the 
most part, principles of logic and good sense valuable only as guides to assist in 
appreciating the meaning which the parties may have intended to attach to the 
expressions that they employed in a document. Their suitability for use in any given 
case hinges on a variety of considerations which have first to be appreciated by the 
interpreter of the document; the particular arrangement of the words and sentences, 
their relation to each other and to other parts of the document, the general nature and 
subject-matter of the document, the circumstances in which it was drawn up, etc. Even 
when a possible occasion for their application may appear to exist, their application is 
not automatic but depends on the conviction of the interpreter that it is appropriate in 
the particular circumstances of the case. In other words, recourse to many of these 
principles is discretionary rather than obligatory and the interpretation of documents is 
to some extent an art, not an exact science. (emphasis is mine)124 
 
One can see the contextuality and situatedness of interpretative approaches in 
a good paper by Lixinski talking about the way that the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (IACtHR) has used the Vienna Convention rules to expand the 
coverage of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR). 125 The IACtHR, 
using the mandate given to it in Article 29 of the ACHR has expanded its reach in 
areas not envisaged by the drafters of the convention. It has, [r]eferring to the 
International Court of Justice’s Namibia Advisory Opinion [...] said that international 
legal instruments should always be interpreted in light of the normative framework 
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in force at the moment the interpretation is done” and therefore, “rejected any 
‘historical’ interpretations.”126 Furthermore, the IACtHR has taken a so called pro 
homine approach to interpretation, i.e. that the provisions of the ACHR are to be 
interpreted  
 
in a way which is most protective of human rights. This declared ‘bias’ of 
the Court is another means of advancing interpretation in accordance with 
the purposes of the treaty: by choosing the pro homine way, the Inter-
American Court dismisses the interpretation of its instrument according to 
the ordinary meaning of its words (the primary rule of interpretation [of the 
Vienna Convention]) or any other traditional cannons of interpretation, 
instead directly serving the teleology of the interpretation.127 
 
Consequently, “[t]his means that the specific rules on interpretation of the 
Convention are instrumental in nature, and not substantive, as a rule on 
interpretation should be”128 and that the IACtHR “has rejected interpretations which 
aim at looking for the ‘original intent’ of an instrument, rather asserting that the 
normative context of a rule at the moment it is interpreted should be the key 
factor.”129 All very well, however, given these statements one wonders what Lixinski 
means by rules of interpretation as being instrumental but not substantive since a 
rule that is instrumental, i.e. wants to achieve a certain goal must also be substantive 
because it comes from a substantive point of view, not a neutral and procedural one. 
If Lixinski means that interpretative rules/methodologies are neutral tools that can be 
used to achieve any end then that would go in the face of his analysis since it would 
not be necessary to adopt a specific approach to interpretation – any would do and 
no need to argue for and justify that adoption for all methodologies can lead to any 
desired outcome. There is no need to choose between a historical or pro homine or any 
other approach for either would do.  
On the contrary rules of interpretation are both instrumental and substantive, 
they are substantive because they have a specific content behind them (if you find 
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yourself in a situation like this then do that – a rule of thumb) and they are 
instrumental because they have a purpose behind them and are there to achieve 
something (stick to the drafters’ intentions, sensitivity to individuals rather than 
states – being pro homine, taking care of the unity of international law etc. or a 
combination of the above). For instance, the rule ‘odious clauses should be 
interpreted restrictively’ may be drafted as a neutral and instrumental rule for the 
term odious can mean anything (neutral) but it is instrumental because it is geared 
toward restricting something which is odious. However, this rule would be 
impossible to use without filling in the content of the word odious for without any 
substance to the word odious the rule can be used for anything and can be an 
instrument of any purpose. But once one fills it with purpose, once one specifies 
what is the thing that is odious, the rule becomes a substantive one for it now has a 
specific content. A neutral rule cannot resist any imposition of substance to it making 
it neutral until one decides to marshal it into one’s service. Once the interpreter 
marshals it, and does it so successfully it loses its neutrality.  
After reviewing the way that the IACtHR has used its pro homine approach in 
specific topics,130 Lixinski concludes that the  
 
Vienna Convention is used by the Court [IACtHR] as a means to establish its 
connections to general international law, but at the same time the Court makes 
it clear that the human rights system is separate from, and even arguably 
superior to general international law. Instead of using the Vienna Convention’s 
basic tenet of interpretation in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the 
words of the treaty (first part of Article 31(1) of that instrument), the Court uses 
the teleological tool referred to at the end of the same provision of the Vienna 
Convention.131 
 
Furthermore, the IACtHR has “systematically invoked treaties outside the [...] 
system as a means to expand its jurisdiction” while at the same time “more 
politically delicate contexts, such as indigenous rights and economic, social, and 
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cultural rights, municipal law (or internalized international treaties) seems to play a 
larger role in interpreting the American Convention” while still at other times, “such 
as international humanitarian law, the [IACtHR] has more easily referred to other 
international treaties as interpretative aids, but it has also shown some reluctance at 
invoking international criminal law, using it only as part of the ‘factual matrix’ of the 
case.”132 Moreover, “the use of foreign instruments is more often than not a search for 
external validation rather than an actual excursion in waters not charted by the 
American Convention. New dimensions are added to pre-existing rights, but rarely 
does the [IACtHR] actually engage in creating new rights.”133 Nevertheless, despite 
or even because of the IACtHR progressive stance on human rights, the Court itself 
“is checked by moderate concerns to accommodate more sensitive subjects [...] in its 
quest for greater human rights protection, which bears in mind that having states as 
part of a system and applying with decisions is every bit as important as progressive, 
pro homine interpretation”134 of the ACHR.  
Lixinski’s paper and his insights is a great example of how courts use 
interpretative methodologies/rules in a contextual way as well as on the nature of 
interpretative rules as such. They are instrumental and substantive; they are tied to a 
specific purpose, in the IACtHR’s case to the purpose of achieving a greater human 
rights protection for the individual. But like the normative trilemmas of international 
criminal law, the IACtHR has to balance its humanistic, pro homine approach with a 
desire to have as many states on-board the Inter-American system. As such, the 
IACtHR has used the tactic of relying on other international instruments to support 
its decisions. It has divorced the third prong of the Vienna Convention Article 31(1) 
rule from the rest and masked its decisions in the familiar object and purpose 
methodology. In short what it has done is followed the contingent and contextual 
rule of pro homine, unless another important factor enters the mix, like keeping 
convention states in the convention regime, at which point municipal law rather than 
international law is the one that becomes ‘informative’. It is not that the Vienna 
Convention rules provide for any constraints on interpretation, they are actually 
marshalled in towards the expansion of the ‘meaning’ of an instrument. Rather, the 
constraint of the IACtHR is more institutional in character135 that has more to do with 
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the tug and pull of the system itself and the IACtHR’s surroundings and conceptions 
of its place and role.  
Another such excellent account of judging – which as I claim is also mistaken 
for interpretation – is the recent book written by Isabelle Van Damme, Treaty 
Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body.136 Van Damme starts out somewhat well 
when she says that  
 
Interpretation presupposes an authoritative text, something authored from 
which the text receives its particular status as law. Treaty interpretation 
comprises finding the meaning of the actual language of the treaty […]137 
 
Hence, interpretation is the process by which we arrive at the meaning of an 
authored text and comes before applying that text as law to a particular fact 
situation.138 Furthermore, interpretation is a holistic process, quoting Abi Saab who 
talks about interpretation as  
 
one integrated operation which uses several tools simultaneously to shed 
light from different angles on the interpreted text; these tools should not be seen 
as watertight compartments or as a series of separate sub-operations but, rather, 
as connected (even overlapping) and mutually reinforcing parts of a whole, of a 
continuum or a continuous and multifaceted process that cannot be reduced to 
a mechanical operation and which partakes as much of art (the art of judgement) 
as of science (the science of law).139 
 
Moreover, “[p]rinciples of treaty interpretation are neither rules, nor principles in the 
classic sense of ‘something [...] which underlies a rule, and explains or provides the 
reason for it’. […] They help answer why a rule is to be given one meaning and not 
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another.”140 And finally, “principles of interpretation are ‘principles of logic and good 
sense’ that guide the interpreter in finding and justifying the meaning of the language 
used in a treaty.”141 So far so good, interpretation needs a text that is authored and 
the principles of interpretation (which are not hard and fast rules of interpretation 
but something to be used in a holistic process that is contextually and situationally 
contingent) help guide the interpreter in discovering the meaning of a text. 
Wonderful nuggets like these continue throughout the book like for instance the 
paragraph in which she says that 
 
Discrepancies exist in the manner in which courts and tribunals explain and 
justify how they interpret the treaty language. But even if they articulate in 
clear terms their interpretative practice, it is less common for adjudicators to 
specify the reasons for preferring certain principles of interpretation to others. 
An analysis of any court’s interpretative practices relies on a degree of pragmatism 
shown in its decisions. There is no guarantee that a judgment discloses all the principles 
applied, all the elements of interpretation taken into account, and the weight given to 
the latter. In most cases, interpretation is also a ‘matter of judicial instinct’, and 
an indeterminate process to arrive at a determinate meaning of a legal text.142 
[footnote omitted, emphasis is mine.] 
 
Or that “it is hard to conceive how the process of interpretation can be governed by 
legal rules in the ordinary sense of the term, as relatively determinate directions to a 
given result”143 and therefore “it is difficult to set out a clear ‘trajectory’ of treaty 
interpretation, that is, the different steps in the process. The interpretative practices 
of international courts and tribunals cannot easily be analysed into distinct schools of 
interpretation.”144 
Sadly, Van Damme, even after these wonderful insights, still manages to fall 
in the now all too familiar trap of distinguishing authors’ meaning with a text’s 
meaning and this becomes evident when she talks about the different schools of 
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interpretation for while she explains the emphasis of the different schools and gives a 
good account of the intent based school of interpretation, i.e. that “[t]he claim that 
‘[t]he intent of the parties ... is the law’, and the belief that interpretation ‘is the search 
for the real intention of the contracting parties in using the language employed by 
them’ undoubtedly reflect the orthodox wisdom underlying treaty interpretation” 
and that “interpretation is about finding the intentions of the parties; this is 
undisputed”145, she also disregards the intent based account of interpretation because 
it “answers little or nothing to questions such as whose intention, what was intended, 
and at what time that intention matters”146 and because “they are insufficient to 
interpret a specific treaty provision in its context.”147 The usefulness of an entire 
account to interpretation is discarded not because it is true or not or whether it gives 
an accurate description of what we do when we do interpretation (search for the 
intention of the parties) but because it does not give an interpreter any useful 
guidelines, rules and/or advice on how to proceed with interpreting an authored text. 
It is ultimately where the hope in interpretative methodology talk lies, in having and 
giving steps to judges that can be followed and therefore constrained; it is a version 
of paint by numbers where the tough choice of judging would be done by somebody 
else – an impersonal methodology – and not the judge for the view of a judge having 
a choice in the matter is frightening. And if judges do have a choice then lets tie them 
down to steps, to methods and neutral abstract principles and let them paint by 
numbers. 
Unfortunately, no account, at least no accurate account of interpretation can 
give one predefined steps to take in order to find the intentions of the parties in every 
and all cases; it cannot give one a methodology in the sense searched after by Grover, 
for what an accurate account of interpretation can give us is a notion of what 
interpretation is, not how to do it. It can give us a direction and not pre-defined steps 
to take, it can give rules of thumb dependent on situations and contexts and not 
context free, neutral methodologies that will ultimately turn out to be flawed, for 
interpretation is something one does regardless of the account that one has of it. It 
comes with experience amassed while conversing with other people, it comes from 
the experience of reading books, writing letters and emails, and when it comes to the 
particularities of a specific profession like law, it comes from the experience gained 
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from going to law school, reading judgments, understanding topics such as law, 
justice, states, state parties, international agreements, wrongful acts, international 
crimes etc., etc., for this experience will tell you whether one source of evidence 
about the intention of the parties is credible or not. And if it is credible evidence, then 
an interpreter can have no other choice but to take it into account if interpretation is 
what she is set out to do for once one discards credible evidence for the intentions of 
the author one discards interpretation and starts doing something else which may or 
may not be part of the process of judging, and may or may not be its legitimate part. 
At a certain point a conundrum appears: what does Van Damme mean when 
she says that principles of treaty interpretation “are principles of logic and order that 
both constrain and empower the interpreter.”148 A charitable interpretation that can 
be constructed from the paragraphs surrounding that statement would be that rules 
of interpretation, which are not hard and fast rules but principles of good sense, 
empower the interpreter by providing her with grounds of “justification, tools to 
build credibility and assert [her] judicial function […] and aids to making [her] 
decisions acceptable and comprehensible” 149 and that they are and have been, when 
it comes to the WTO Applet Body at least, “instrumental in justifying and making 
acceptable its early choice to function as a court and thus to build its legitimacy as a 
judicial actor.” 150  They would constrain the interpreter, however, by “providing 
guidance […] [by being] instruments to achieve accountability, [and] as techniques to 
order and structure their reasoning process.”151 This, in a sense, is no different from 
the first prong that Grover says any good methodology must fulfill i.e. “to guide [the 
interpreter’s] reasoning process when confronted with interpretative issues.”152 In 
this sense, the premise of the constraining nature of methodologies/principles of 
interpretation is that they represent a check on the less gentle natures of the 
interpreters so when they are confronted with an interpretative issue they will take 
the pre-defined steps set out in the Vienna Convention Articles 31-33 (or any other 
methodologies) to arrive at the meaning of the text or that when an interpreter sits 
down to interpret a text she goes through an imaginary procedure where she ticks a 
box with headings like “good faith” (check), “ordinary meaning” (check), “context” 
(check) after every treaty phrase read/interpreted. In a related article Van Damme 
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states that “[i]t is expected that a judicial body, considering disputed terms in a treaty, 
arrives at its interpretation of the terms by reference to established principles of 
treaty interpretation.”153  
Unfortunately for Van Damme, this is not what is going on when one arrives 
at a judicial decision for it is not arrived by references to established principles of 
treaty interpretation but rather it is argued through them as well as through other 
legal concepts. It is what Albie Sachs has called the Tock of the judicial clock coming 
before the Tick, the notion that “every judgment I write tells a lie against itself”154 
because the “orderly, clear, sequential narrative form”155 of a written judgment is in 
essence the opposite of the process of arriving at a decision, it is the process of 
justification rather than the process of thinking through a problem.  
 
This, then, is the falsity: [Judge Sachs writes] the pretence implicit in the 
presentation of a judgment that it has been written exactly in the way it appears. 
All hesitations, sometimes even reversals of positions on certain points, have 
been eviscerated from the final version. All to-ing and fro-ing in the process of 
its construction has been eliminated. Completely left out of account is the 
complexity of the process by which the final reasoned decision has been arrived 
at. In sum, the final format of the judgment belies the manner in which it has 
been produced.156 
 
In the end what we are left with in the judicial written opinion is the judges’ 
best legal justification of their decision, for like other legal doctrines and concepts 
their absence in a judicial decision would render it legally incomprehensible, unable 
to be recognized as such by the rest of the legal profession and if a judge were to 
justify her decision using concepts unrecognizable to the legal profession (like the 
lack of a iambic pentameter or the lack of character development in the losing sides 
written submissions) then that judge would rightfully receive the scorn of her peers 
for what she would have done is not “doing law” but “doing” something else.  It is 
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my claim that at most what methodologies can accomplish regarding constraint of 
interpretation is to put the interpreter in a mind-set that what one should watch out 
is ordinary meaning taken in its context together with and the object and purpose i.e. 
to read a treaty as it was an authored legal text and not a painting or a sculpture. 
Once one realizes that there is no place where these suggestions can go beyond the 
point of putting the interpreter in a mind-set that what one is reading is a legal text 
authored by somebody who has a purpose and a message written down in the form 
of a text (and this is already a long way into an interpretation), methodologies about 
reading texts become useless in reading them.157 Once one interprets a text as a treaty 
one cannot but see something in the context of the law and having a purpose to 
regulate something in one way or another. One cannot know what the ordinary 
meaning of a word in a treaty is if one has not previously also learned what a treaty 
is, what states are, what is the basic structure of the international system, what states 
do and what they are for, in essence without the knowledge gained by going through 
a very specific training that one receives by being a member of a specific profession, 
that of an international lawyer or scholar. And here in the end we come again at the 
difference between interpretation and judging for judging involves more than just 
finding out what a text means but it involves arriving at a decision that is seen just 
and legal according to changing and contestable standards of justice and legality.158  
 
5. CONCLUSION – THE CONSTRAINING NATURE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATIVE 
METHODOLOGIES  
 
If interpretative methodologies cannot deliver what they promise, if they 
cannot deliver hard and fast rules that would take the discretion out of interpreters 
when interpreting texts, if rules of interpretation, like the additional rules of 
interpretation regarding the use of dictionaries as proposed by Professor Chan-Fa 
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Lo,159 cannot even spell out the terms of their own interpretation160 then can we say 
that interpretation, and through that extension judging, is a wholly unconstrained 
“anything-goes” activity? I would argue not, and not because methodological rules 
(like rules of interpretation) cannot “spell out the conditions of their own 
application”161 but exactly because they are legal methodologies that they do their 
constraining work and they do this work no differently than any other legal doctrine.  
As Fish has said 
 
[the] conclusion that might seem to be the one I, myself, was moving toward 
in the course of presenting these examples, for surely the moral of Columbia 
Nitrogen … (and countless others that could be adduced) is that the parol 
evidence rules is wholly ineffective as a stay against interpretative assaults on 
the express language of contracts and statutes. But the moral I wish to draw 
goes in quite another direction, one that reaffirms (although not in the way 
formalist will find comforting) the power both of the parole evidence rule and 
of the language whose “rights” it would protect, to provide meaningful 
constraint on public and private conduct.” It is certainly the case that Masterson 
v. Sinne, like Columbia Nitrogen and the others, indicates that no matter how 
carefully a contract is drafted it cannot resist incorporation into a persuasively 
told story in the course of whose unfolding its significance may be altered from 
what it had seemed to be. But the same cases also indicate that the story so told 
cannot be any old story; it must be one that fashions its coherence out of 
materials that it is required to take into account. The important fact about 
Masterson is not that in it the court succeeds in getting around the parol 
evidence rule, but that it is the parol evidence rule – and not the first chapter of 
Genensis or the first law of thermodynamics – that it feels obliged to get around. 
That is, given the constraints of the institutional setting – constraints that help 
shape the issue being adjudicated – the court could not proceed on its way 
                                                          
159
 Lo, ‘Good Faith Use of Dictionary in the Search of Ordinary Meaning under the Wto Dispute Settlement 
Understanding’; Chang-Fa Lo, ‘A Clearer Rule for Dictionary Use Will Not Affect Holistic Approach and 
Flexibility of Treaty Interpretation—a Rejoinder to Dr Isabelle Van Damme’ (2011) Journal of International 
Dispute Settlement; Van Damme, ‘On 'Good Faith Use of Dictionary in the Search of Ordinary Meaning under 
the Wto Dispute Settlement Understanding'--a Reply to Professor Chang-Fa Lo’ 
160
 See for instance Fish, ‘Fish V. Fiss’ 
161
 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Constitutionalism as a Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes About International 
Law and Globalization’ (2006) 8 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 9 at 9. 
MultiRights Research Paper 
 
50 
without raising and dealing with the parol evidence rule (and this would be 
true even if the rule had not been invoked by the eager trustee); consequently, 
the path to the result it finally reaches is constrained, in part, by the very 
doctrine that result will fail to honor.162 
 
Consequently, legal methodologies of interpretation do their constraining 
work not by being true to their promises of making legal interpreters stick to the 
meaning of a text or by providing explicit meanings, but by providing us with, as the 
Commission’s crucible approach, legally relevant interpretation for a legally relevant 
interpretation in international law will be the one that is partly argued through the 
interpretative doctrines currently in play at various international courts – the ICJ, 
ECtHR, ECJ, IACtHR, HRC -  clear textual meaning, object and purpose, context, 
subsequent state practice, evolutive interpretation, the living instrument, margin of 
application and if these and other legal concepts are not found in a judicial opinion 
then it would be hard to see what is the judicial in the judicial opinion. And this is 
where the paradox of interpretive methodologies or doctrines lay, they create 
constraints not by providing the thing that they promise – a series of steps that one 
can take to do the interpretative job – but by providing areas around which 
argumentation and justification can take place, for only certain type of arguments 
will be seen as persuasive some of the time but not all types of arguments all of the 
time thus providing stability and openness to change at the same time and what 
determines this stability and openness is contextual – it depends on the judicial 
regime, its surroundings, its point in its existence, on the purposes and principles 
behind that regime, the quality of the judges sitting on the bench, etc. etc. etc. – and 
probably most importantly what has been called having “a legal mindset”. 163
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